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namaste – A history
Namaste (nah-mah-STAY) is a Hindi word meaning, the 
Spirit in me meets the same Spirit in you. It is a South 
Asian greeting, originating in India that is used for hello 
and goodbye. The greeting is commonly accompanied 
by a slight bow made with the hands pressed together, 
palms touching, in front of the chest. This is a well-rec-
ognized symbolic gesture in which one hand represents 
the higher, spiritual nature, while the other represents 
the worldly self.  By combining the two, the person 
making the gesture is attempting to rise above their 
differences with others, and connect themselves to the 
person he/she bows to. The bow is symbolic of love  
and respect. 
This journal is meant to promote the study of human 
rights at the University of Connecticut and is to serve 
as a venue for recognizing and displaying great academic 
achievements of both undergraduate and graduate 
students in this field of study.   
Recognizing the work being done within the human 
rights community at UConn will foster an environ-
ment that promotes mutual respect. More than that, it 
is hoped that this ideal will be embraced by university 
community members and translated in various ways and 
works to the larger global community. 
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foreword
This inaugural issue of Namaste, which is edited and produced en-
tirely by undergraduate students at the University of Connecticut, is 
made possible by a grant from the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center 
in honor of the 10th anniversary of its founding at the University of 
Connecticut. The dedication of the Center in October 15 began 
a process that over the next ten years has established the Univer-
sity of Connecticut as an internationally known center for human 
rights scholarship, education, and outreach. As part of its academic 
program in human rights, the University established an undergradu-
ate human rights minor which continues to attract a growing number 
of students.
In conjunction with other 10th anniversary celebratory events, 
several University faculty organized a Human Rights Essay and 
Creative Writing Contest for undergraduate students. The work of 
the student winners is featured in this volume. It is fitting that the 
celebratory events of a Research Center dedicated to preserving 
the archives of those who have fought for human rights in the past 
include a tribute to the work of the next generation of individuals 
who will fight for global justice. It has been gratifying to witness the 
enthusiasm, initiative, and dedication of the student editors and pro-
ducers of this volume. They are busy putting ideas into action.
With great hope for the future,
Anne L. Hiskes
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Storrs, Connecticut
April 2, 2006

j. michael tower
Palestinian female suicide bombers: 
a new nationalism, a new feminism,  
or a new exploitation
(December 2005)
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about michael
Michael is an undergraduate at the University of Con-
necticut studying Women’s Studies and Sociology, class 
of 2006. Michael’s research interests center around 
women’s access to institutions of power and masculin-
ity studies. He was a One Year Visiting Student in the 
sociology department at Trinity College in Dublin, 
Ireland when he wrote the essay included in this volume. 
Michael will be attending Social Work graduate school in 
the fall of 2006.
The emergence of Palestinian female suicide bombers 
radically redefined the role of women in the national-
ist struggle for Palestinian statehood and the fight for 
women’s equality. Is women’s martyrdom the paradigm 
for gender equality and women’s commitment to the 
nationalist struggle, as Islamic fundamentalists allege?  
To assess the claim, this essay places the rise of the 
Palestinian female suicide bomber within a 30 – year 
history of grassroots activism by Women’s Committees, 
gender relations in the first and second intifada, and 
growth of the Islamic fundamentalist movement at the 
end of the 20th century. These elements are linked to 
the life circumstances behind each martyrdom to reveal 
the external influences and internal motivations behind 
each woman’s choice to commit suicide. This historical 
analysis reveals a coercive patriarchal influence involved 
in the promotion of women’s martyrdom and casts se-
vere doubt on the libratory nature of Palestinian female 
suicide bombers.   
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Wafa Idris slept in on Sunday, January  27th, 2002. Buying her niece 
a glass of fruit juice on her way out of her Palestinian hometown, she 
headed to Jerusalem layered in explosives. Dressed in a Western 
style coat with long flowing hair and manicured nails, she looked like 
just another tourist shopping for shoes in east Jerusalem. In a flash 
of light and explosion of flesh, Idris began a new chapter in women’s 
historical fight for social liberation in the Palestinian state. Since then 
a heroic appreciation of female suicide bombers emerged in certain 
segments of the Palestinian population. To discuss the implications 
of this on women’s liberation and national liberation, I will trace the 
efforts and strategies of the women’s movement over the past 30 
years by concentrating on patriarchal institutional involvement and 
grassroots activism. I will further discuss how the ideology of the 
female suicide bomber is constructed by fundamentalists as both 
socially and nationally liberationist for the women involved. I will 
conclude by discussing how the mechanisms behind women’s martyr-
dom actually reinforce traditional gender hierarchies and hinder the 
development of social liberation for women of Palestine.
 
women’s committees of the 1970’s and 80’s
The first women’s committee, the Women’s Work Committee 
(WWC) was established following the International Women’s 
Day conference in 178. Women had been active in the nationalist 
struggle for years, but the formation of the WWC refocused wom-
en’s activism to their own gender oppression within their occupied  
territories. As its mission stated, the WWC sought “improvement 
in women’s political, economic, social, and cultural status as part of 
the process of liberation from all forms of exploitation.”1 The activist 
women recognized that women’s lives would improve little if Israeli 
oppressive force were simply replaced by patriarchal tyranny under a 
Palestinian state. The educated, upper class women who constituted 
the WWC early groups made efforts to transcend their class privi-
lege. They began by focusing on the development programs for the 
vast majority of Palestinian women who lived in villages and refugee 
camps with the most severe gender oppression. In the early 180’s, 
the WWC fractured into four distinct committees, each correspond-
ing to a faction within the PLO, or Palestinian  
Liberation Organization.  
The fragmentation of the women’s movement was a mixed result 
for the development of a women’s consciousness in Palestine. While 
more women’s committees enabled greater outreach and education 
to the population, ideological differences created a schism among the 
malerie schwartz Self-portrait
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committees. The primary issue that caused strife was in many ways 
the most important  these groups dealt with: should women’s libera-
tion be a constant feature of national liberation, or should nationalist 
interests supercede the fight for gender equality?  
The four major women’s committees were not indifferent to these 
fundamental approaches in the functioning of their organizations.
Two groups believed women’s liberation must go hand in hand with 
national liberation, another believed that gender issues need to take 
a back seat to nationalist priorities, and yet another believed that 
social equality would inevitably accompany national liberation on its 
own. These and other ideological differences often placed women’s 
groups with oppositional attitudes toward one another. Commit-
tees wasted precious resources competing against each other to 
establish day care centers in the same community. Some observers 
of the women’s committees in the early 180’s argue that the leaders 
of the four women’s committees seemed to have more in common 
with the men in their respective PLO factions than with each other. 
In spite of the divisions among the groups, the committees achieved 
significant success promoting women’s liberation in the years leading 
up to the first Intifada.
Each women’s committee mobilized outreach efforts to assist rural 
women bound by domesticity and urban women encountering wage, 
vacation, and other issues.  Conceptually, social liberation gained 
distinction from national liberation as the achievement of “women’s 
spaces” in the committees spurred initial discussions for women to 
explore their gender oppression. Interventions within rural com-
munities enabled women to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency and 
accomplishment outside the home. However, the real achievement 
of the women’s committees was more fundamental.  
The women’s committees in the 180’s managed an important bal-
ance between grassroots involvement and inclusion with patriarchal 
decision-making organizations such as the PLO. Women’s groups 
never wholly depended on the institutions of the patriarchy for 
accomplishing steps towards women’s liberation. While the commit-
tees were tied to the PLO at the higher levels, women developed 
and implemented their own strategies. Women themselves created 
the operational models for their committee structure, conducted 
their own research into rural women’s needs, and formulated 
outreach programs on their own terms. Committee leaders and 
rural women who participated in the training programs took their 
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new skills and operational knowledge to the nationalist struggle in 
December 1987, with the first intifada.
palestinian women in the first intifada
Responding to decades of abuse by the Israeli military, Palestinian 
society mobilized a spontaneous, massive resistance movement with 
the intifada of 187. Palestinian women stepped into the nationalist 
domain, joining men in protesting, violating curfews and closures, and 
physically confronting Israeli armed forces. Women’s committees 
stepped to the fore, using their years of organizational experience 
to coordinate demonstrations, continue the education of children, 
and cultivating crops no longer available during the boycott of Israeli 
goods. “Behold our women,” one revolutionary booklet proclaimed, 
“a fighting force comparable to that of our men.” With their hus-
bands imprisoned or confined by curfews, women assumed responsi-
bility for heading up households, running family businesses, and other 
roles traditionally limited to patriarchal privilege. The freedoms many 
women experienced in the early intifada helped them to understand 
that without social liberation, national liberation would be meaning-
less in the lives of Palestinian women. This tragic instance of women 
being heaved back into the domestic sphere following a hard fought 
struggle for nationhood, made Palestinian women promise them-
selves not to become “another Algeria.”  
Chaotic social upheavals, such as the Intifada, often destabilize 
gender roles in order to mount an effective resistance movement. 
However, once the initial period of excitement passes, societies typi-
cally return to familiar hierarchies to reassert order and stability into 
their lives once more. Rema Hammami argues that the emergence of 
popular committees months after the beginning of the first Intifada 
initiated this return of women into the domestic sphere. Another 
source of public exclusion for women came from the growing influ-
ence of Islamicists in Palestine.
The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in the Early Intifada
Several months after the intifada began, attitudes in the streets of 
the Occupied Territories shifted as Palestinians realized that in spite 
of the intense struggle and personal sacrifice made by virtually all 
in the collective resistance, little concrete advancement was made 
towards the nationalist goal. Fundamentalist voices blamed the 
inefficacy of the  intifada on a loss of religious principles. Hamas and 
others offered religious fundamentalism as the solution to achiev-
ing the nationalist goal. More importantly, Hamas offered Gaza the 
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region suffering the most brutality, personal hardship, health care 
and other services in exchange for religious adherence.  Funda-
mentalism quickly gained popularity in Gaza, and traditional gender 
roles were reasserted as Hamas ordered women to veil and men 
to retake the sole responsibility of the public nationalist struggle. 
Prior to the veiling requirement, many Palestinian women veiled out 
of personal choice. However, coercive veiling enforced by Hamas 
attacks represented a significant backlash against the autonomy 
of women. Neither the newly formed Women’s Higher Council 
(WHC), a representative body of all women’s committees, nor the 
individual committees themselves, dealt effectively with the danger 
imposed by early fundamentalist impositions on women. In fact there 
was little political opposition to the fundamentalist uprising, fearing 
that factionalism within the Palestinian resistance movement was just 
what Israel hoped for. As a result, voices promoting the importance 
of women’s equality and national liberation were effectively silenced. 
It should be noted that women’s committees never politically 
established women’s role in the early Intifada, which was a signifi-
cant opportunity to reorder gender roles . Women’s participation 
before and after the fundamentalist backlash of the first intifada was 
consistently within the proscribed boundaries of  patriarchal institu-
tions. This caused women to never directly challenge the system 
promoting women’s subservience. Additionally, the WHC did little to 
create a unified women’s agenda in the face of an increasingly hostile 
fundamentalist environment. Also many other women’s committees 
were complicit in allowing social liberation to take a back seat to the 
nationalist struggle.  
Women’s progressive role in the early Intifada never achieved a 
systematic reconceptualization of gender in Palestinian society. How-
ever, many scholars argue that the women’s violent exclusion and 
sudden return to domesticity highlighted the disadvantages attendant 
to traditional Palestinian womanhood, and a broad based women’s 
consciousness, a Palestinian feminism, finally emerged.   
women’s centers: non-patriarchal routes to social liberation
During the fundamentalist backlash of the 10’s, Palestinian 
women began to work outside of patriarchal power structures for 
the nationalist cause, developing the tools for social liberation in 
anticipation of new Palestinian state. The four women’s committees 
continued to work separately in the villages and urban areas of the 
Occupied Territories. They helped organize women into co-op-
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eratives, producing foodstuffs, clothing, and other goods usually 
bought from Israelis. Women developed useful skills and a degree 
of economic independence through their participation in produc-
tion co-ops . Concurrently, the women’s movement continued to 
establish alternative means of achieving equality through the creation 
of women’s centers throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The women’s centers provided space for women to network, un-
derstand their oppression, and formulate strategies to undermine it. 
The first of the centers, the Women’s Affairs Center, concentrated 
on providing job training (literacy, vocational instruction, computer 
training) and research into Palestinian gender oppression. Other cen-
ters concentrated on consciousness-raising efforts, such as holding 
lectures on violence against women, women’s health, and women in 
social change. These centers were prevalent in towns throughout the 
Occupied Territories and provided safe spaces for women to plan for 
their social liberation.  The Bisan Center for Research and Develop-
ment, founded in 10, began to address some of the classist struc-
tural issues in the women’s movement by “bridging the gap between 
women active in the grassroots movement and the female academics 
and professionals.” Feminist thought reached greater populations and 
the women’s movement broadened as rural women interacted with 
urban professionals and academic formulating strategies for gender 
liberation.  
 
As women’s voices were strengthened by the establishment of the 
centers, Palestinian leaders objected to women raising “peripheral” 
gender issues during a time of nationalist struggle. Women com-
mittees and centers persisted by using workshops and lectures 
to engage the public with issues of domestic violence. Also they 
provided hotlines and shelters to help women confront their oppres-
sion. These and other initiatives drove gender issues into the public 
discourse, working towards the “empowerment of women through 
gender awareness.” Women’s centers and committees continued to 
work outside the bounds of the patriarchy until 14 with the signing 
of the Oslo Accords. 
shifting priorities: patriarchal inclusion and losing touch with the 
grass rooots 
In 14, Palestinian leaders gathered together to form the frame-
work for the Palestinian Authority and draft the Basic Law to act as a 
temporary constitution until a permanent state was formed. Women 
activists secured the creation of the Women’s Affairs Technical Com-
alyssa allaben Woman
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mittee, a quasi-governmental organization responsible for drafting a 
Women’s Bill of Rights for use in the eventual creation of a Palestin-
ian state. Members of the women’s committees, the General Union 
of Palestinian Women, and independent feminists were included 
in discussions to give the document a broad base of support. The 
Women’s Bill of Rights grounded its authority in the United Na-
tions Convention to End Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
achieving a distinctly feminist quality.  However, this concentration on 
institutional participation led women’s groups to abandon grass roots 
involvement.  
During this formative stage of the Palestinian statehood, women 
attempted to establish a strong presence as a model for future gen-
der-inclusive operations. It was vitally important for women to assert 
their voices, however, during the process, women’s committees lost 
their connection to the grassroots and became enwrapped in the 
restraints of patriarchy. Co-ops in small communities disbanded, 
literacy programs lost funding, and women’s centers withdrew sup-
port for child-care centers. Activist women became more concerned 
with processes of patriarchal inclusion and representation than with 
the continued programmatic support of women throughout the Oc-
cupied Territories.  
 
In the 180’s and early 0’s, women’s committees traditionally 
provided a lot of the charitable support in hard hit regions like the 
Gaza Strip. They provided medical care while  administering food 
production/distribution programs to relieve the desperation caused 
by the Israeli Occupation and the turmoil of the intifada. Having dras-
tic consequences, as women’s committee’s ceased their community 
involvement, fundamentalist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
stepped into the vacuum. Funded by Syria and Iran, Islamicists used 
charity to win the hearts and minds of Palestinians.  Fundamental-
ism became not only a way to provide for one’s family, but religiosity 
became a sacred form of political resistance and an expression of 
nationalism. Within this context came the rise of the female suicide 
bomber in 2002.
the women’s movement and the female suicide bomber
Following the suicide bombing death of Wafa Idris, fundamentalist 
organizations seized upon the idea that women should again take up 
the nationalist struggle through direct, violent means.  Sheik Has-
sin, spiritual guide to Hamas, offered a unique religious reward to 
encourage women to take part in suicide bombing:
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If they are not married they are guaranteed a pure husband in Para-
dise, and of course they are entitled to bring seventy of their relatives 
to join them there without suffering the anguish of death.  
Fundamentalists were offering women a privilege they had previ-
ously stripped from them in the early intifada – membership in 
the nationalistic struggle. The Palestinian leadership reinforced the 
nationalist implications of female martyrdom. One of them eulogizing 
Idris, declared, “Wafa’s martyrdom restored honor to the national 
role of the Palestinian woman, sketched the most wonderful pictures 
of heroism in the long battle for national liberation.” Using women 
as a symbol of the nation, Islamicists called up on women to assert 
their nationalism through violent action. Images of the heroic female 
martyr permeated the media, constructing martyrdom and acts of 
violence by women as proof of their commitment to securing Pal-
estinian statehood. Just as the rise of an ideology of female martyrs 
was nationalistic in purpose, it was constructed as socially liberating 
as well. 
In a strange twist of circumstance, fundamentalists offer the reward 
that women’s groups have been fighting  a century for – social libera-
tion. Or at least their definition of it.  Since the early backlash  in the 
first Intifada, fundamentalist groups have been responsible for repro-
ducing the subjugation of women to the men in their lives.  Ironically, 
the ideology of the female suicide bomber constructed by the same 
Islamicists, capitalizes on women’s desire to be free from this subor-
dination. The persuasiveness of these arguments is revealed in the 
attitudes of some Palestinian women. According to one woman who 
failed in her bombing attempt, women’s martyrdom is “definitely a 
step forward for equality for women throughout the Arab world”  
because if women are able to fight and die like men, that indicates 
significant progress toward gender equality. With women’s groups no 
longer doing much activist work in towns and villages, fundamental-
ists have taken their place and constructed martyrdom, instead of 
self-sufficiency, as the route to gender equality. In order to under-
stand the truly deceptive nature of the fundamentalists’ “gender 
equality,” few key circumstances that motivate women to become 
martyrs, should be taken into account
the mechanisms behind women’s martyrdom
Militant groups target Palestinian women who are particularly vulner-
able in their personal lives.  Wafa Idris, her mother explains, found 
herself in such a situation. “My daughter’s husband divorced her be-
cause she couldn’t have children. Wafa knew she could never marry 
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again because a divorced woman is tainted…She was young, intel-
ligent, and beautiful and had nothing to live for.” (emphasis added)  
Reading the biographical notes on other women suicide bombers, 
one consistently finds evidence of gender related baggage. These 
women are even raped to make them vulnerable . In every case 
of suicide bombing, a father, brother, uncle, or close family friend 
– always male – has played a central role in convincing the women 
that suicide is the only honorable recourse . Women martyrs are not 
spontaneous expressions of nationalist rage – they are the result of 
calculated, managed recruitment efforts by fundamentalists to use 
downtrodden women as military weapons.
 
In conclusion, women’s martyrdom is the latest redefinition of 
women’s role and reflects negatively on women’s status in the social 
and nationalistic landscape in Palestine. Women martyrs, and fun-
damentalists groups creating them, attempted to insert themselves 
into the void of women’s groups who are losing touch with the grass 
roots in Gaza. Fundamentalists have attempted to assert their own 
version of “feminism,” to serve their own military interests. A true 
Palestinian gender equality demands self-determination for women, 
not the freedom to do “manly” things. Fundamentalists have only 
established another set of standards by which Muslim women are to 
be judged and punished. Basically, as long as fundamentalist men have 
the power to define feminism and “equality” for women, Palestine 
will never achieve true gender equality.
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for children

about megan
Megan McDonald graduated cum laude from UCONN 
in May of 2005 with a degree in Political Science and 
a minor in Human Rights. She interned at the Human 
Rights Institute and at Lawyers without Borders and 
worked at the Office of the Attorney General. She was 
Vice President of Amnesty International, Vice President 
of Lawyers without Borders Student Division, House 
Manager of the V-Day Campaign and a UNESCO 
Student Ambassador for Human Rights. She was also a 
member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the political science  
honor society.
Currently, Megan is a first year student at Pace Uni-
versity School of Law and is pursuing Children’s Rights 
law.  At Pace, she is involved in numerous organizations.  
She is co-chair of the Public Interest Law Scholarship 
Organization’s Silent Auction Committee, Treasurer of 
the Women’s Association of Law Students and a mem-
ber of Phi Alpha Delta.  
This paper was awarded second place in the Dodd 
Center Human Rights Writing Competition and the 
Economic Rights Poster Contest.
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The concept of human rights is a highly contentious aspect of inter-
national politics.  The focus has historically been on human rights 
as a whole, but in recent years children’s rights have entered the 
spotlight. In 18, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)  
was finalized. Soon after coming into force in 1990, it became the 
most ratified convention in United Nations’ history. The document 
protects children from a multitude of harms by outlining the specific 
rights to which children are entitled. Among these rights are the 
right to education (Article 28 states that primary education must be 
compulsory and free for all) and the right to protection from child 
labor (Article 32 states that there should be a minimum age for em-
ployment). Following this triumph of the children’s rights movement, 
another movement emerged--one directly contradicting (wording?) 
many of the rights outlined in the CRC itself, yet using Article 12 as a 
main point of argument. Article 12 states that children have a right to 
express their views about matters that affect them. This new move-
ment is a movement not only for children but by children.  
A social movement is composed of three main elements. First, there 
must be a political opportunity structure, or a critical opening which 
allows a trigger for change. This opportunity certainly opened for 
working children with the advent of the children’s rights movement. 
The CRC and the ensuing focus on children’s rights allowed the 
working children to have a place in the discussion about their rights. 
The African Movement of Working Children and Youth (AMWCY) 
formally established themselves in 14.  The second main element 
necessary for a social movement to emerge is a mobilizing structure, 
or a network of people put into action to create change. Remark-
ably, the children created this structure almost entirely on their own. 
Though grassroots groups of working children began to form in dif-
ferent areas, they remained in communication through conferences 
and other events. Finally, framing--the act of naming wrongs and 
claiming rights--is central to social movement evolution. These chil-
dren have achieved this aspect of social movement development in a 
most powerful manner. With reference to documents that are sup-
posed to protect them, the working children have carefully outlined 
aspects that they argue infringe on their rights and do more harm 
than good. tFurther, they have outlined precisely what rights they feel 
they are entitled to and specified which forms of labor are accept-
able to them. Through integration of these three crucial elements, 
the working children have emerged as a valid social movement.
The Working Children’s Movement spread to several areas where 
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child labor is the reality of life for many children who are economi-
cally tied to the practice, and who resent adults telling them that 
they cannot work, when they need to. Children from Africa, India, 
and Latin America challenged the creators of the CRC and other 
children’s rights documents, demanding their voices be heard when 
it comes to decisions made on their behalf. They maintain that their 
right to work should not be limited by adults, especially when their 
own opinions are not taken into account. This movement by children 
has caused many children’s rights advocates to reexamine their own 
ideas about child labor, causing controversy within the children’s 
rights movement at large.
 
The Working Children’s Movement can be traced to the establish-
ment of the  AMWCY in 14, when the founders of the movement 
not only identified 12 rights to help them eliminate exploitation and 
the worst forms of child labor, but also set up a plan for promoting 
those rights. The rights include the right to learn a trade and partici-
pate in light and limited work. Children involved in this movement 
concentrated on their own experiences in determining the most 
important protections that they needed, some that are ignored 
completely by adult “advocates”. Taking the development of these 
rights into their own hands demonstrated that the children were in 
fact quite serious about being heard as a movement.  
The movement further progressed in 17 in Oslo, when four young 
activists walked out of an international NGO meeting connected to 
the World Summit on Child Labor wearing gags on their mouths to 
demonstrate the way they felt the adults viewed them. These young 
activists believed that the adults in the meeting were ignoring their 
thoughts and not letting them speak. Greeted by the press outside 
of the meeting, they presented their agenda to improve conditions 
for working children.  
One of these activists was a representative of the “Movement of 
Working Boys, Girls and Adolescents of Nicaragua (NATRAS) -- an 
advocacy organization that provides support services for working 
children.” This organization is funded through Save the Children 
Canada  and has been credited with developing special curricula 
designed with working children in mind. One organization affiliated 
with NATRAS, La Fundacion “La Verde Sonrisa”, stated its goal to 
provide education for children that includes not only academics, but 
skill training in areas such as carpentry and baking as well. Programs 
like these demonstrate that while the children need to work, they 
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also want to go to school, provided they learn beneficial skills.  
 
This revolutionary children’s rights movement spread to many other 
countries in addition to Nicaragua. A much larger group formed 
in Latin America and the Caribbean at large, calling itself the Latin 
American and Caribbean Movement of Working Children and Ado-
lescent, or MOLACNATS. This movement exists in approximately 
fifteen countries. In addition to the Latin American movement, 
multiple movements exist in India. The Indian Working Children’s 
Movement is composed of ten working children’s organizations from 
central and southern India. A Working Children’s Syndicate is being 
formed in the northern part of India, where an organization known 
as Ballah Mazdoor organizes independent working children typi-
cally threatened by the dangers of the streets. Clearly, the working 
children’s movement is not one that can be ignored, nor is it going 
away. These individual movements from country to country are 
all bound together tightly and remain in communication with each 
other. For many, this solidarity began in 16 when an international 
meeting took place in Kundapur, India.   
 
The first International Meeting of Working Children, held in India in 
16, consisted of twenty-nine working child delegates from Asia, 
Latin America and Africa and produced ten points of consensus, 
referred to as The Kundapur Declaration. Within the declaration, the 
children outlined the points they considered most important to the 
core of the movement, including that they “are against the boycott 
of products made by children, want an education system that is 
adapted to [their] reality and capabilities [and] are against exploita-
tion at work but…are for work with dignity with hours adapted so 
that [they] have time for education and leisure”.  These points utilized 
some articles from the CRC, such as the articles granting time for lei-
sure and education, but made an important distinction about work. 
The children made it clear that, while they would not be exploited, 
they had the right to work and earn a living.  
They also determined that they, the Working Children and Youth 
Movements, must always be consulted about decisions concerning 
child work. To facilitate cooperation and reinforce their solidarity, 
they later created an International Co-ordination of Working Chil-
dren Movements. As a group, they have participated in numerous 
conferences on child labor and children’s rights, which significantly 
increased their power and visibility. The meeting at Oslo, which 
sparked international attention following the walk out by gagged child 
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delegates, is just one example of how this movement has increased 
attention towards its goals.
In 2000, at the 5th Meeting of the AMWCY, the Working Children’s 
Movement achieved yet another success when they participated in a 
debate with the Regional Director of UNICEF. This debate led her to 
agree to “support the AMWCY, within the limits of available means 
and of her mandate”. Support from UNICEF demonstrated just how 
far the children in the movement had carried their message and signi-
fied the realization by adults that children must be further incorpo-
rated into the decision-making process. The children at the confer-
ence concluded by declaring the changes they had made to the state 
of their rights, saying that, “In places where we are organized, our 
12 rights have considerably progressed for us and for other Work-
ing Children and Youth”.   Arguably, they have been as effective in 
promoting their rights and advancing their mission as many politically 
driven conventions and doctrines developed by adults.
 
In 2004, at the 2nd Meeting of the World Movement of Work-
ing Children and Adolescents in Berlin, child workers from around 
the world gathered again to voice their concerns and state their 
achievements. Too often, adults ignore all that children have to teach 
and concentrate solely on what they have to learn, something that 
people realized at this meeting. At this meeting, the children once 
again made the distinction between work that is suitable for them 
and that which is unacceptable, or that  exploits them.   Perhaps the 
most important statement made in the final declaration of the meet-
ing was one aimed at the International Labor Organization (ILO), in 
which the child workers denounced “the policies of the ILO that aim 
at abolishing children’s work. The ILO has failed to understand the 
realities of working children and the viable alternatives to exploit-
ative labor”.   
In 1, the ILO established Convention 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor, mandating that all members who signed the Convention 
took measures to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. As the 
working children agree, the worst forms of child labor are prostitu-
tion, slavery, drug trafficking and work, which, “by its nature…is likely 
to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” Still, though, the 
ILO has larger aims to completely eradicate child labor, proclaiming 
it a “global cause”  on their website. This conflicts with the message 
of the working children, who concluded the final declaration of their 
second meeting with the mantra, “Yes to Dignified Work-No to Ex-
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ploitation Because We Are Not Part of the Problem But Part of the 
Solution So That Our Voice Be Heard in the Whole World,” further 
frustrating cooperation between the two groups. By pointing out to 
the ILO the paradox of calling for the elimination of all child labor 
when ILO 182 sets a rubric for distinguishing between various forms 
of child labor, the child workers point out a problem of generaliza-
tion they view as very detrimental to their overall well being.  
People outside the movement see this inconsistency as well. 
UNESCO journalist Sophie Boukhari feels that the ILO and UNI-
CEF have been forced to recognize that abolishing child labor only 
pushes children into more dangerous jobs, such as prostitution. Still, 
Boukhari points out the ambiguity behind the UN’s viewpoint on 
child labor and its position on the movement of working children 
in general, saying that, “The UN recognizes it is unrealistic and 
dangerous to want to abolish child labor…But the UN continues 
to campaign for abolition.”  UNICEF, while sometimes seeming to 
support the Working Children’s Movement, “‘is strongly urging the 
World Trade Organization to adopt a ‘social clause’,’ which would 
require minimum standards from companies, including a ban on child 
labor.”  It is this “flip-flopping” that continues to confuse the world 
and frustrate the Working Children’s Movement about what is in the 
true “best interest”  of the children on whose behalf these decisions 
are being made.       
While substantial information in support of the movement abounds, 
criticism of the movement is not widely published. One highly re-
spected academic in the field of child labor, William Myers, believes 
the reasoning behind this is quite obvious. “Who is going to go on 
record in full print attacking kids? They probably would risk losing 
more than they would gain by being perceived as anti-child”. Instead 
of directly criticizing the Working Children’s Movement, criticism 
tends to be disguised.  
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU, 
founded in 1949, has over 200 affiliated organizations in 154 coun-
tries, and believes that no child should be deprived of an education 
or a childhood. The ICFTU encourages strict adherence to interna-
tional conventions on labor standards, especially those made by the 
ILO. The ICFTU works closely with the ILO and membership is open 
only to trade unions structured democratically and immune from 
outside influence. Campaigns by the ICFTU cover a variety of issues 
related to labor rights, including “the respect and defense of trade 
namaste  37
union and workers’ rights, the eradication of forced and child labor… 
[and] encouraging the organization of young workers.”   
Interestingly, the ICFTU counts one of their campaigns as organiz-
ing youth workers, but another as eradicating child labor. The small 
differentiations the ICFTU makes between child and youth workers 
may seem significant to them – but the actual child workers see this 
discrepancy as arbitrary, detrimental to their well being, and a clear 
violation of their right to work to survive.
The claim that abolishing child labor is a matter of political will largely 
oversimplifies the problem as something that can be ended simply 
by making it illegal.  In fact, the idea that child labor and all of the 
problems that accompany it will disappear once a country makes the 
practice illegal is akin to saying that poverty will be eradicated if a 
country’s government uses political will to make  poverty illegal. Not 
only does this idea neglect that economic measures must be taken to 
eradicate poverty; it does not answer the question of where all the 
poor people would go. If they knew that they would be in trouble for 
being poor, they would have to hide their poverty. Likewise, children 
who are unable to get work through conventional methods would be 
forced to turn to illegal and exploitative means of income, those that 
are outlawed under ILO Convention 182.  
Perhaps the most compelling example of why abolishing child labor 
simply does not solve the problem can be found with the conse-
quences of the Harkin Bill. United States Senator Harkin sponsored 
the ‘Child Labor Deterrence Act of 12’, a bill that proposed the 
prohibition of U.S. imports made by children and an international 
ban on products made from child labor. In Bangladesh (a likely first 
target, were the bill to have become law), an estimated 50,000 
working children were fired. This caused the recently fired children 
to turn to much more dangerous and exploitive means of work, 
with some children begging on the streets or turning to prostitution. 
Many scholars caution that substantial damage can be done when 
Northern ideals are imposed on the Southern countries, citing the 
Bangladesh case as “a warning about the consequences of simplisti-
cally applying rich-country assumptions and remedies to poor-coun-
try situations without adequate attention to differences of social and 
economic context.”  
By following an abolitionist approach  to child labor instead of a 
regulative approach, the ICFTU seeks to eradicate child labor instead 
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of providing children with protection through better working condi-
tions, which would be far more effective to the lives of the world’s 
working children. The ICFTU does not appreciate the economic 
hardships that would be placed upon working children and their 
families if child labor were made illegal. Also, they do not recognize 
that the former child workers, in an attempt to find another source 
of income, will turn to illegal, unregulated jobs (such as prostitution) 
in order to survive. It makes far more sense to create legislation that 
would protect the children from being exploited, such as limiting the 
number of hours they can work and allotting time for school and 
play, than to make work illegal altogether, thereby ensuring that the 
children will turn to far more dangerous jobs to make up their lost 
income. The ICFTU believes that work combined with education is 
not sufficient.  This directly contradicts the beliefs of the Working 
Children’s Movement as a whole – that children desire an education 
in addition to the freedom to work so that their daily lives actually 
contribute in a positive way to their futures without neglecting their 
needs at the present time – and ignores the warnings of experts in 
the field.  
The ‘labor market perspective’ accompanies the abolitionist ap-
proach and has been proven to be more detrimental than beneficial 
to the lives of child workers, placing the interests of adults over those 
of children and ignoring the reality of children’s situations-- that they 
need to work in order to survive. This perspective is concerned with 
the impact child labor has on adult labor. A particular viewpoint of 
children goes along with this perspective, drawing upon the West-
ern idea of childhood as a work-free time of life and the concept 
that children are “essentially innocent, ignorant of the world and 
incompetent to fend off its evils or even to recognize their own best 
interest.”    
Another organization vehemently opposed to the Working Chil-
dren’s Movement is the Global March against Child Labor, whose 
main objective lies in enforcing and expanding existing child labor 
laws. The Global March movement began when a group of people 
committed to ending child labor marched to the ILO Conference 
in Geneva, where ILO 182 was drafted. While the working children 
agree with ILO 182, the Global March can be seen as an opposing 
force to the Working Children’s Movement, describing one of its 
objectives as eradicating child labor. When members of the Working 
Children’s Movement met in 18, they announced that they would 
not “participate in the Global March against Child Labour because 
namaste  3
it’s organisers refused to involve us and because we cannot march 
against our own work” .
One of the risks of the Global March is that it over generalizes child 
labor as slave labor, stating that it is a “movement born out of hope 
and the need felt by thousands of people across the globe-the desire 
to set children free from servitude”. The fact of the matter is not 
only do child workers distinguish between child labor and slavery, the 
ILO does so as well with ILO 182, naming slavery as one of the worst 
forms of child labor.     
The opposition movements above represent the historical response 
to child labor – campaigning for prohibitions against the practice of 
child labor in general. This is generally reached with a combination 
of abolitionist and protectionist (regulative) approaches mentioned 
above. The abolitionist portion involves fixing a minimum age for 
children to become employed while the protectionist piece involves 
legislation with an additional age for the employment of young 
people, generally specifying the number of hours and the type of 
jobs this group of people can participate in. This can be seen in the 
United States with the minimum age for employment set at 15 and 
restrictions placed on young people between the ages of 15 and 18.   
The problem with this approach is that it is rarely enforced and may 
in fact be unenforceable. Many scholars hold that the way to fix 
the problem of child labor is not through compulsory education or 
labor legislation, instead arguing that the most important factor is, 
and always has been, family income. From the point of view of this 
school of thought, abolishing child labor will not fix the problem; the 
only way to fix the problem is for a country to become developed 
enough for families to have enough money without their children’s 
income supplementing their own.
Ben White, a scholar in the field of child labor, believes that the 
employment of children is not in itself a problem; the “real problem 
is not in the age but in the fact that young workers are often subject 
to exaggerated forms of labor control and exploitation beyond 
those faced by adults because of the way society treats young 
people.   Intervention groups seeking abolition, like Global March 
and ICFTU, utilize an approach that may in fact make the child labor 
problem worse. The reason that people turn towards the abolitionist 
approach is because they deny the ability of children to make their 
own decisions and to know what is best for their own lives – largely 
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because the “prevailing view of childhood itself has seen children 
as passive victims and appropriate objects of external intervention, 
rather than as social subjects or agents of change, capable of both 
claiming and exercising rights.” Above all, the focus needs to be on 
understanding the reasons for and problems of child employment, 
not on eradicating it entirely. To achieve this aim, intervention groups 
need to “support the efforts of working children in trying to improve 
the conditions of life and work.”  
In 187, the Indonesian government realized the validity of regula-
tive measures and issued the ‘Ministerial Regulation for Protection 
of Children who are Compelled to Work’ which recognized that 
there were certain social-economic conditions that required children 
below the minimum age to work and stipulated certain provisions 
that could not be violated, including minimum hours during the night, 
minimum wage standards and the opportunity of an education. 
This provision was abandoned in 13, following pressure from the 
United States which threatened to withdraw some trading privileges. 
Additional pressure came from the ‘Child Labor Deterrence Act of 
12’, referenced above in the Bangladesh case, which called for a 
ban on all U.S. imports made by child labor. Similar tactics of boycot-
ting, not condoned by the working children, can be seen inside the 
ICFTU as well. This increased pressure has forced many children to 
work illegally, leaving them without protection of any kind.  
In a world where decisions are often made quickly and without con-
sideration for the potential consequences, something as delicate as 
the well being of children should come under careful consideration 
and scrutiny. Clearly, the Bangladeshi experience mentioned above 
demonstrates that economic rights must be included in children’s 
rights, as “this case illustrates the serious consequences of ignor-
ing children’s economic rights in the rush to ban work by children”. 
Thinking through the implications of a policy is always necessary.  
The U.N., UNICEF and the world at large need to recognize the seri-
ous implications that come from enforcing the rules of the developed 
world on a global level.  The Western world cannot continue to 
make global policy when they do not understand the reasons behind 
the existence of the developing world’s problems.  It is easy to say 
that all children should go to school and not have to work, but for 
countries heavily in debt, where school funding is scarce, this is easier 
said than done. If children are going to work out of necessity, the 
world owes it to them to protect their rights in a manner suitable to 
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their situation. Otherwise, the world is not doing much to advance 
the rights of the children most at risk.                                          
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i. introduction
Relatively little attention is paid to economic human rights. The 
justiciability of these rights is still under international debate, so it is 
hardly surprising that there is no internationally agreed upon mea-
sure of countries’ protection of these rights. Scholars have developed 
a number of indices that attempt to illustrate economic rights condi-
tions, but these do not reflect governments’ capacity and willingness 
to adequately protect these rights. This paper has two purposes: 
the first is to construct a measure of governments’ economic rights 
practices compared with their capacity to provide economic rights. 
The second is to examine possible policy variables that may explain 
variations in levels of economic rights practices, including govern-
ment expenditures on health, education and military, level of exports 
of goods and services, inequality, debt servicing, and the presence of 
International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs.
 
ii. economic rights
Economic rights are sometimes not considered human rights at all. A 
criticism of economic rights is that “[they] have been defined primar-
ily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively” and the drafting 
of a separate covenant for these rights “reflect[s] an assessment of 
the practical difficulties that states would face in implementing gen-
eralized norms requiring substantial time and resources” (Dennis and 
Stewart, 2004).  However, it has not been empirically proven that 
economic rights are more expensive to protect than other human 
rights (Donnelly, 2003). 
Most Western countries such as the U.S. have historically embraced 
civil and political rights while excluding economic rights when ad-
dressing human rights in law and practice. For example, the U.S. has 
ratified the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
but has not ratified the United Nations Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR).
International agreements such as the CESCR provide a theoretical 
framework in which to address economic rights but fail to articulate 
standards of government economic rights practices that would be 
useful in enforcing those rights (Robertson, 14). The covenant 
also lacks a clear enforcement mechanism. A measure of economic 
rights practices is crucial to adequately monitor governments’ 
implementation of espoused policies.  Governments too frequently 
claim extensive legislation and policies that are intended to protect 
economic rights, but the end result is that these policies are not put 
into action. A measure that targets government economic practices 
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may be more useful in analyzing policy and directing future efforts in 
improving economic rights conditions.
iii. social rights as a prerequisite for economic rights
The indicators chosen for the measurement of economic rights in 
this study are based on the underlying assumption that social rights 
are a prerequisite for economic rights. The Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights states:
…a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of 
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, 
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant [to 
fulfill economic rights]. (OHCHR, 1990)
If a person is starving, they lack the capacity to work. If a person is 
denied adequate healthcare, they are not able to fully maximize their 
freedom to work. This assumption shapes the choice of economic 
rights indicators in this study. This notion also illustrates the fact that 
economic rights are undeniably linked to resources.  
This assumption also opens the debate about economic rights 
fulfillment and its relationship to a country’s wealth. Economic rights 
measures that use wealth as an indicator of economic rights practices 
are unfair to poor countries. Furthermore, that type of measure 
offers no opportunity for cross-country comparison; poor countries 
will inevitably score lower than rich countries in their economic 
rights practices. Therefore this study uses GDP/capita to indicate a 
country’s ability to protect economic rights, not as an indicator of a 
country’s economic rights practices.
Hence resource use is a key part of the study of countries’ economic 
rights practices. The CESCR is the most widely accepted articula-
tion of economic rights. It includes the right to work, the right of 
everyone to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, fair wages 
and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction 
of any kind and that provides for a decent standard of living, and the 
right of everyone to a decent standard of living. Article 2, Section 1 
of the covenant states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
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means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
(OHCHR, 166) 
This broad statement makes it difficult to measure a country’s 
compliance in protecting economic rights. How do we measure state 
compliance with the obligation “to the maximum of its available 
resources?” The committee emphasizes “even where the available 
resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a 
State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances” (OHCHR, 10).
iv. measurement problems
There are many obstacles to developing a good measure of econom-
ic rights that is both accurate and universally accepted. Insufficient 
or misreported data is one of the greatest challenges. For example, 
unemployment statistics are largely absent from developing countries 
data, and particularly in agrarian societies, the seasonal nature of 
agricultural production leaves most people unemployed for at least 
some part of the year. In rich countries such as the U.S., the Human 
Poverty Index is not reported. Inequality is another statistic that has 
significant gaps of missing data. Furthermore, researchers collect-
ing data often rely on second-hand sources such as news reports; 
for example new reports of torture convey not actual incidences of 
torture, but the incidences of news reports of torture (Barsh, 13).
Determining which indicators are most important in measuring 
economic rights is also problematic. Quantifying concepts such as 
the right to work and the right to health may appear to be a simple 
task, but in reality the chosen indicators may or may not measure the 
concepts they are supposed to represent (Barsh, 13). Research-
ers often pick and choose indicators based on which ones correlate 
most to their hypotheses instead of indicators that will produce the 
most accurate results, and therefore produce biased results in their 
studies.
Assigning appropriate values to indicators is another area where 
researchers make mistakes. Since an appropriate measure must be 
simple and easy to construct, assigning weights to indicators can 
oversimplify the actual economic rights conditions in a country.  
Charles Humana’s World Human Rights Guide includes a measure-
ment of “social and economic equality for ethnic minorities” in the 
Americas for which there were three scores: full respect, some 
namaste  54
violations, and substantial violations (Humana, 186). These three 
categories are broad and unrealistic, particularly in assuming that 
some countries score with full respect. No country is perfect, but in 
order to measure the economic and social rights conditions, Humana 
must discount certain violations in order for the measure to be 
simple enough to be applied universally.  
Many of the measures that have been developed focus on other 
human rights, particularly physical integrity rights such as the right to 
live free from torture. Measures that focus exclusively on economic 
rights include the work of Cingranelli and Richards (2004) and Kime-
nyi (2005). Cingranelli and Richards measure government respect 
for economic rights using the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), 
while Kimenyi uses the United Nations Human Development Index. 
Both examine the residuals in their regressions that regress the PQLI 
against GDP to determine the level of government willingness to 
protect economic rights.  
 
v. measure background
The proposed measure in this study builds from Cingranelli and Rich-
ards’ basic contention that government respect for economic rights 
is a function of both ability and willingness (Cingranelli and Richards, 
2004). Ability reflects the available resources a government can use 
to protect economic rights, and willingness reflects how willing they 
are to direct those available resources towards the protection of 
economic rights. In this study we use GDP/capita to reflect the avail-
able resources a government can use to protect economic rights.
A measure of economic rights practices must include an indicator for 
the economic rights conditions in the country. Standard of living indi-
cators are an adequate proxy for economic rights conditions because 
there is a strong correlation between poverty and economic rights 
conditions. People who do not have basic needs such as food or 
adequate health care cannot fully exercise their economic rights. This 
notion is based on the relationship between economic and social 
rights discussed earlier in the paper.  
Measures most frequently used to reflect standard of living and 
poverty are development indicators such as the Physical Quality 
of Life Index (PQLI) and the United Nations Human Development 
Index (HDI). The PQLI encompasses infant mortality, life expectancy 
at age one, and basic literacy (UNDP, 2004). The HDI measures 
life expectancy at birth, knowledgeability as embodied by the adult 
creative drawing group Detail #002
mural, 2006
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literacy rate and gross school enrollment at all levels, and GDP per 
capita (UNDP, 2004).  
Development indicators are strongly correlated with national wealth, 
implying that poor countries will inevitably score lower on economic 
rights protection than richer countries.  This relationship is exten-
sively documented in development research and is the unfortunate 
reality for poorer countries. Therefore, it is unfair to measure eco-
nomic rights protection without accounting for countries’ ability and 
available resources to protect those rights.
Both PQLI and HDI measure standard of living, but they do not cap-
ture all the aspects of poverty that relate to economic rights. PQLI 
reflects levels of health and knowledge, but does not reflect whether 
people enjoy a decent standard of living. Furthermore, because the 
infant mortality rate and life expectancy at age one reflect levels of 
health, this aspect of economic rights is double counted. The HDI 
includes GDP/capita as one of its component indices, but since this 
study attempts to analyze income and its relationship to standard of 
living, we cannot use an indicator that is based on income.
The UN Human Poverty Index (HPI) used in this study summarizes 
deprivations in longevity as measured by the probability at birth of 
not surviving to age 40, deprivations in knowledgeability as measured 
by the percentage of illiterate adults, and deprivations in a decent 
standard of living as measured by [BOTH] the percentage of people 
without sustainable access to an improved water source and the 
percentage of underweight children below age five (UNDP, 2004). 
The HPI’s measure employs the same aspects of human develop-
ment as HDI but reflects a wider range of variables that define 
poverty without using GDP/capita. This gives a better estimate of 
the level of economic rights protection. In addition, the HPI weights 
deprivations in each of the three areas – health, education, standard 
of living – equally unlike the PQLI. The value of the HPI ranges from 
zero, implying no one in the population is deprived in any of the 
three areas, to 100 implying that everyone is deprived in all three of 
the areas. The value of the HPI can be interpreted as the average 
percentage of the population that experiences deprivation in one of 
the areas. By subtracting the HPI from 100, one obtains an indicator 
of the average percentage of the population that enjoys economic 
rights fulfillment in one of the three areas.
vi. hiv/aids
Another important variable that influences a country’s ability to 
100 – HPI = a + b(GDP/capita $PPP) + c(GDP/capita 
$PPP)2 + d(HIV prevalence) + e.
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protect economic rights is HIV/AIDS prevalence. This factor is most 
often noted briefly, and at worst completely overlooked as a factor 
influencing a government’s ability to provide a decent standard of 
living and to protect economic rights. The devastating impact of 
HIV/AIDS affects all aspects of human and economic development. 
Countries with the highest levels of HIV/AIDS prevalence experience 
decreases in economic growth by as much as 1 to 2 percent (Popula-
tion and Development Review, 2001). HIV/AIDS severely reduces 
governments’ capacity to respond to social needs beyond immedi-
ate treatment. HIV/AIDS has a disastrous impact on the capacity of 
Governments to deliver basic social services.  Human resources are 
lost, public revenues reduced and budgets diverted towards coping 
with the impact. (Population and Development Review, 2001)
HIV/AIDS also affects poverty variables included in HPI such as 
health, education and standard of living. Countries with the highest 
levels of HIV/AIDS have seen increases in under-five mortality rates 
and lower life expectancy at birth. Education and literacy rates are 
affected as teachers die and orphans whose parents died from HIV/
AIDS drop out of school. Food security is also reduced as HIV/AIDS 
affects food production.
There are a number of factors that affect a government’s ability to 
provide a decent standard of living to the poorest in its population 
besides national income and HIV/AIDS prevalence, however, the 
overwhelming impact of HIV/AIDS on all aspects of society and its 
rapid spread make it a unique variable. The unlikeliness of a present 
solution to cure HIV/AIDS, the costliness of treatment, and the huge 
reversals in economic and human development it causes warrants it 
special attention when assessing a country’s ability to fulfill its citizens’ 
economic rights.
vii. proposed measure
The proposed measure in this study of a government’s willingness 
to direct available resources towards securing it’s citizens’ economic 
rights is derived by estimating:
GDP/capita $PPP and HIV prevalence reflect governments’ ability to 
protect economic rights. GDP/capita $PPP squared is used to illus-
model unstandardized  
coefficients
standardized  
coefficients
b std. 
error
beta
t sig.
1 constant
gdp/cap
gdpsqu
hiv
57.75
.006
-1.82E-07
-.80
2.11
.001
.000
.161
1.357
-.875
-.363
26.357
.061
-5.870
-5.514
.000
.000
.000
.000
a  Dependent Variable: 100-HPI
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trate the curvilinear relationship between GDP/capita and standard 
of living in which standard of living rises as GDP/capita increases at a 
decreasing rate. I use 100 – HPI to reflect the portion of the popula-
tion that is not poor and enjoys economic rights. The residual signi-
fies the government’s willingness to protect economic rights. If the 
residual is positive, that means the country’s government raised the 
standard of living and level of protection of economic rights more 
than would be expected given its ability. If the residual is negative, 
the government has done worse than would be expected given its 
available resources.  Cingranelli and Roberts, as well as many others, 
have analyzed the residual as an indicator of performance in this 
context.  
In considering government willingness, government’s may be more 
than willing to devote resources to protect economic rights but may 
not see positive results.  Governments may be exerting great effort 
towards implementing economic rights, but due to other factors may 
not be successful. Our measure of economic rights therefore is more 
a measure of effective policy implementation and practices signified 
by the term “willingness.”
Data on only 177 countries was available from the United Nations 
Development Program 2004 Human Development Report (UN-
HDR). Data on the HPI is available for 80 member countries.  
viii. results from regression 1
The regression shows a strong relationship between HPI and the 
variables GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, and HIV preva-
lence. As predicted, the results from our measure clearly indicate a 
statistically significant positive correlation between per capita income 
and standard of living. As GDP per capita rises, 100-HPI initially rises 
but subsequently falls once per capita income rises above roughly 
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PPP $15,000. Also, there is a strong statistically significant correla-
tion between HIV prevalence and HPI. HIV prevalence negatively 
affects the standard of living and the economic rights conditions in 
the country.
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Appendix A contains the list of countries and their residuals. Unfor-
tunately, since the majority of industrialized nations do not have data 
on HPI-1, their residuals are not included in this study. These include 
Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland, 
the United States, Japan, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
Finland, Austria, Luxemburg, France, Denmark, New Zealand, Ger-
many, Spain, Italy, and Israel. The UNHDR report also excludes the 
following UN member countries for which HPI cannot be computed: 
Afghanistan, Andorra, Iraq, Kiribati, the Democratic Republic of Ko-
rea, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Somalia, and Tuvalu.
Also, a number of other countries from various development cat-
egories do not have residuals listed due to missing data. However, 
among the countries included, there is wide variation in residuals, 
with some performing much higher than their ability and a few per-
forming much worse. Most notably, Bolivia has the highest positive 
residual, 14.68514, reflecting it’s top performance in protecting eco-
nomic rights, and Oman has the largest negative residual, -32.2304, 
the worst economic rights score.  
These scores are interpreted as reflecting governments’ economic 
rights practices.  Defining the residual in such a narrow sense may be 
problematic; the residual is meant to represent all unexplained vari-
ables in the equation. As noted earlier, “willingness” may include fac-
tors other than government inclination to direct available resources 
towards protecting economic rights. However, since there is a strong 
correlation between GDP per capita and HPI, and HIV prevalence 
and HPI, it is less risky to interpret the residual as a variation of those 
variables. The strong statistical significance implies that the residual 
may be interpreted as a variation of government respect for eco-
nomic rights.  Furthermore, the residuals also capture measurement 
error unrelated to a country’s ability to provide economic rights.
ix. policy variables
The second purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the fac-
tors that affect countries’ performance in protecting economic rights. 
“Willingness” embodies the government’s willingness, policy success, 
and other variables that may affect the economic rights conditions 
in a country. Governments need to implement the right policies that 
are actually effective in providing for economic rights. Defining the 
factors that influence policy success is difficult because they are not 
tangible; many unquantifiable, but key aspects, are political environ-
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ment, corruption, and underdeveloped institutions. However, focus-
ing on government expenditures as a percentage of GDP is useful in 
developing a framework to understand the residual in our measure. 
Looking at the expenditures as a percentage of GDP also corrects 
for differences in cross-country wealth, providing a more fair analysis.
Health and education expenditures are frequently used as indica-
tors of the government’s willingness to raise the standard of living. 
This study uses data on public health expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP $PPP, public expenditure on pre-primary and primary educa-
tion as a percentage of GDP $PPP, [AND] public expenditure on 
education as a percentage of GDP $PPP; this data is taken from the 
United Nations Development Program 2004 Human Development 
Report (UNHDR).. The UNHDR defines public health expenditure 
as current and capital spending from government (central and local) 
budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from 
international agencies and non-governmental organizations) and 
social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.  
The UNHDR defines public education expenditure as both capital 
expenditures (spending on construction, renovation, major repairs 
and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and current expendi-
tures (spending on goods and services that are consumed within the 
current year and would need to be renewed the following year). It 
covers such expenditures as staff salaries and benefits, contracted or 
purchased services, books and teaching materials, welfare services, 
furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rents, tele-
communication and travel.
On the other hand, military expenditures may reflect the govern-
ment’s unwillingness to direct available resources towards raising the 
standard of living and protecting economic rights.  It is noted that 
some governments are forced to maintain a high level of military ex-
penditures due to civil and international conflict; however, it remains 
an important indication of the direction of public funds. Military 
expenditures as defined by the UNHDR include all expenditures of 
the defense ministry and other ministries on recruiting and train-
ing military personnel as well as on construction and purchase of 
military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the 
expenditures of the donor country.
Inequality is also a variable that may affect the standard of living. 
The adverse affects of inequality are well documented. Fundamental 
aspects of development including openness, institutions, and educa-
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tion are the means through which the middle class raises its level of 
income and standard of living.
The evidence suggests that the positive association between middle 
class share and economic development…is due to a causal effect of 
the former on the latter…[H]igh inequality [is] a large and statisti-
cally significant hindrance to developing the mechanisms by which 
economic development is achieved. (Easterly, 2002)
Inequality is a barrier to raising a country’s standard of living because 
it fuels underdevelopment in areas such as nutrition, education, and 
health. Asset inequality in particular, and especially of human capital, 
disproportionately affects income growth of the poor. A more even 
distribution of assets increases the income of the poor and directly 
reduces poverty (Birdsall and Londono, 17). High levels of inequal-
ity can also become barriers to employment as individuals come to 
believe that efforts to improve their human capital or compete in 
the market would be futile.  Therefore there is substantial evidence 
to hypothesize that inequality may be a mitigating factor in explaining 
the level of protection of economic rights. This study uses the Gini 
index taken from data in the UNHDR (2004).
Debt service as a percentage of GDP is also a policy variable that 
may explain differences in levels of economic rights. For poorer 
countries, diverting limited funds towards debt service may have a 
devastating impact on the standard of living and level of economic 
rights enjoyment. Countries owing the most debt face higher levels 
of malnutrition, infant mortality, disease, and illiteracy than other de-
veloping countries at comparable per capita income levels (Maguire, 
2000). These countries that seek loans in the first place tend to have 
pre-existing low levels of growth and high levels of poverty, and debt 
servicing further exacerbates the poverty conditions.  
It is now well established that debt is incompatible with, and in fact 
deleterious to, human development.  The central message…is that 
the current levels of debt among heavily indebted poor countries 
have severe negative consequences for human development, 
because external debt servicing requirements limit the resources 
available for investments in human development and discourage 
economic growth. (Maguire, 2000)
Many poor countries divert significantly more resources towards 
debt servicing than on social services such as health and education. 
African governments spend an average of four times more on debt 
repayments to northern creditors than they spend on health and 
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education. The Philippines spends 30% more of its national budget 
on debt servicing than on social services. Other countries with simi-
lar ratios include Brazil, Cameroon, Jamaica and Zambia (Maguire, 
2000). Examining debt payments as a policy variable affecting eco-
nomic rights protection may help explain variations in the country 
residuals. This study uses debt service as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services for the year 2002. This provides an opportunity 
for cross-country comparison with debt service as a proportion 
of national income. The data are taken from the UNHDR, which 
defines debt service as the sum of principal repayments and interest 
actually paid in foreign currency, goods or services on long-term 
debt (having a maturity of more than one year), interest paid on 
short-term debt and repayments to the International Monetary Fund 
(UNHDR, 2004).
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) response to poor countries’ 
economic crises may also have an effect on economic rights protec-
tion. The IMF’s structural adjustment programs that seek to help 
countries solve balance-of-payments crises, achieve macroeconomic 
growth and reduce poverty are the target of extensive criticism. 
Critics claim that the IMF’s programs actually increase poverty and 
underdevelopment.  MacLeans and Mangum (2001) discuss struc-
tural adjustment programs’ impact on sub-Saharan Africa: 
[A]djustment and stabilization programs tend to endanger human re-
source development.  Even more telling, social conditions and human 
development considerably worsened, with the deterioration in the 
areas of education, health, employment and income, with especially 
serious effects on children, school graduates and women. (Macleans 
and Mangum, 2001)
These effects on standard of living are not surprising given that 
structural adjustment programs raise prices of goods and services by 
removing government subsidies for basic consumption items includ-
ing food, transport, and energy. Local currencies are devalued which 
raises real prices for imported goods and services, and unemploy-
ment increases because of public and private cutbacks in firms who 
are forced to scale back in the face of newly introduced foreign 
competition. Social services are also decreased. These changes have 
a profound impact on the standard of living of the most vulnerable in 
society. The presence of IMF structural adjustment in countries may 
have a unique impact on the levels of economic rights protection. 
To test this hypothesis, a “dummy” variable was created. Countries 
under an IMF program currently or within the past five years were 
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assigned a value of 1, while all other countries were assigned a value 
of zero.
X. Regression 2
To examine the effects of the policy variables on the level of eco-
nomic rights protection the following is estimated:
where y is the residual from regression 1, x
l are the policy variables 
of concern, ß
l their estimated coefficients, ∂ the intercept term, and      
is the error term. The eight policy variables are as follows:
health government expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP
prime gdp government expenditures on pre-primary and primary 
education as a percentage of GDP
education government expenditures on education (all levels) as a 
percentage of GDP
military government expenditures on military as a percentage of 
GDP
export exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP
gini gini coefficient
debt debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services
imf under an IMF program currently or within the last five years
xi. regression 2 results
    
3
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The results from the regression show very little statistical significance 
of the effects of the policy variables on the residual. This evidence is 
contrary to our hypothesis that these variables can significantly ex-
plain variations in government protection of economic rights. These 
results, in regards to the policy variable inequality are surprising given 
the extensive literature that exists concerning the effects of these 
variables on standard of living. The contradictory results in this study 
may be due to the presence of missing data that can result in less 
correlation between the variables and the residual.
To remove any distortions caused by multi-colinearity, I regressed 
each policy variable on the residual separately. This produced similar 
results in which there was no statistical significance in each regres-
sion.
Empirically, this study shows that the policy variables government 
health, education and military expenditures, exports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP, inequality, debt servicing as a 
percentage of exports, and the presence of IMF structural adjust-
ment programs, explain very little about differences in government 
economic rights practices.  However, these relationships may require 
further study.
xii. conclusion
This study has shown that government practices of economic rights 
protection can be measured by regressing GDP per capita, GDP per 
capita squared, and HIV prevalence on 100 minus HPI and examining 
the residual. The measure gives a prediction of a government’s ability 
to protect economic rights based on GDP per capita and HIV preva-
lence. Deviations from this predicted value reflect a government’s 
willingness to protect economic rights with the sign of the residual 
indicating whether they perform better or worse, given their ability. 
I have developed a measure that is simple and allows for cross-coun-
try comparison correcting for differences in national income. The 
evidence shows that economic rights are positively correlated with 
GDP per capita and negatively correlated to HIV prevalence.
Since there is such a high correlation between the independent 
variables and 100 minus HPI, I conclude that the error term in the 
equation explains variations in economic rights protection. However, 
I have also attempted to explain differences in government economic 
rights practices by examining policy variables that have a potential 
impact on the level of government protection of economic rights. 
These policy variables included government expenditures on total 
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education, pre-primary and primary education, health,  military, and 
exports of goods and services, as a percentage of GDP, inequality as 
reflected in the Gini index, debt servicing as a percentage of exports, 
and the presence of IMF structural adjustment programs from 15-
2000. Although there proved to be no statistical significance in the 
relationships between these variables and the residuals from regres-
sion 1, this may be due to the presence of substantial missing data.
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ranking
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-0.1586
-0.663
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Sudan
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Guinea
Benin
Tanzania, U. Rep. of
Côte d’Ivoire
Zambia
Malawi
Angola
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the
Central African Republic
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Guinea-Bissau
Burundi
Mali
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
hdi 
ranking
country residual
12.08818
-.2783
2.6585
-6.36402
0.53256
-10.215
-0.3652
.1301
7.01766
1.71206
-0.81166
4.2227
-2.2815
3.6173
7.0444
-17.5832
-2.8136
-11.8478
-2.22422
-.223
-5.05644
-7.82333
10.73562
-4.485
1.7363
4.74244
-8.8602
-0.65303
-0.04036
.
-2.64575
.
-1.8384
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175
176
177
Burkina Faso
Niger
Sierra Leone
hdi 
ranking
country residual
-20.2568
-25.732
-22.6611
appendix b
descriptive statistics
100-hpi
gdp/capita
gdp/capita^2
hiv prevalence
total health 
total education
primary education
military expenditure
exports
gini
debt
imf
valid n (listwise)
n minimum maximum mean std. deviation
94
174
174
142
175
134
93
127
162
127
116
177
23
34.50
520
270400.00
0
0
1
23940.00
0
7
24
1
0
97.50
61190
3744216100.00
39
8
11
1767780.00
24
151
71
69
1
71.8989
9231.13
184674900.3621
2.57
3.46
4.53
431613.3849
2.67
40.55
40.16
14.65
.23
16.07724
10001.801
394735025.42271
6.136
1.742
1.992
354877.62092
2.807
23.904
10.323
12.079
.423
expenditure
expenditure
expenditure
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about beanjamin
Benjamin is a freshman majoring in history at the 
University of Connecticut. His aspirations are to attend 
law school and become a prosecutor. He also wants to 
eventually become involved in politics.
In his creative writing essay “The threads we wear” 
Benjamin  juxtapositions his own experience as a young 
sales clerk at Sears with an account of the working con-
ditions of those who made the merchandise which he is 
selling. Through this creative device, Benjamin educates 
the reader about his/her own complicity in a system of 
economic injustice.
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It is am. As I speed towards work, I realize that I am supposed to 
be at work at nine.  Oh well, I will be five minutes late, I doubt my 
manager will care. I turn into the parking lot of Sears and hurriedly 
park my car. I hate working at this time, it is so early. My manager is 
pretty flexible, so I feel bad complaining about a 9 a.m. shift. I’m sure 
in a few years, once I complete my education, I will always be work-
ing at  a.m. I walk into the employee entrance and punch in. Then 
I head to my station in the Shoe Department. I go towards the cash 
registers and start them up since I am the first one here in the morn-
ing. There are no customers, so I sit back on the counter. This job is 
pretty laid back. Usually business is relatively slow except around the 
holidays and back to school season. During those seasons manage-
ment usually makes sure there are plenty of treats such as, free subs 
and pizza for everyone in the break room. Since I am opening in 
the shoe department it is my responsibility to make sure everything 
looks sharp for our customers. As I walk through the department I 
inspect the rows of Nikes, Reeboks and the various brands we sell. 
These shoes came from far away. The big boxes they come in are 
usually stamped with places like Port of Shanghai or Port of Singa-
pore. The people that make these shoes live an entirely different life 
than I live. Not just because they are from a different country but  
they also work in  harsher unimaginable conditions. 
The shoe factories  are located in some of the world’s poorest coun-
tries (www.sweatshopwatch.org). China, Indonesia, Haiti, El Salvador, 
Dominican Republic,  are some of the names on the list. The work-
ers in the factories are poorly paid, often between fifteen and thirty 
cents an hour (Ross 24). At times the amount they are paid works 
out to less because management will skim some off the top (Ross 
113). They do not receive pay stubs and are paid in cash (Ross 8). 
This ensures there are no records; without any evidence, no criminal 
complaint can be brought against the manufacturers. The workers 
who make the actual product typically receive less than one percent 
of the product’s retail value (Ross 111). They can barley afford food, 
housing in a shack, and clothes for themselves (Ross 105).  
 
Yes, these sweatshop laborers are unskilled and therefore probably 
the least important people in the chain since anyone can do their 
job. Despite being the base of every apparel company, the workers 
don’t even earn one percent of the products value. I don’t think it 
would be too much for rich company executives to increase their 
manufacturers share by just a little bit. It might mean putting pre-
mium gas instead of super premium gas in their fancy sports cars, but 
creative drawing group Untitled #003
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I think it is a definite possibility.
 
Pay day for me is  pretty simple. I have direct deposit, so beginning at 
12:01 am every other Friday I can log onto www.sears.com and view 
my pay stub electronically. I can save it in PDF format  for further 
review on my computer, or I can print it out and have a hard copy. 
Then I log onto my bank account and see the deposit just made from 
Sears Roebuck and Co. I can immediately access the new funds with 
my debit card, or I can wait till  a.m. in the morning when the bank 
opens.
In addition to their incredibly low salaries, the sweatshop workers 
are cruelly treated and work long hours (Ross 103). The slightest in-
fractions typically result in an immediate termination of their employ-
ment (Ross 98). If they are not fired, then they are beat, whipped 
or tortured.  Sometimes they are beaten because their supervisor 
is in the mood (Ross 113). The females are sexually harassed and 
raped (Ross 113). They have excessively high quotas to meet, and the 
sweatshop supervisors have little sympathy for those who are under 
parity (Ross 101). They work in dirty, dusty and dangerous conditions 
(Ross 105). They are yelled at for daring to use the restroom (Ross 
105).  The most horrific fact is that a good portion of the workers 
are children (Ross 113). As I look upon the shoe wall at Sears and 
see how squeaky clean each pair is, I find myself wondering how they 
could have come out of factories so dirty. No, factory is too good of 
a term to describe these sweatshops. It does not convey the truth 
that the sweatshops  famous brands are manufactured in should 
never pass any sort of inspection in our country.
  
I imagine that the executives of the manufacturing companies  on 
the wall are sitting in the back of limousines as they make their way 
to work. Those executives have probably had a healthy breakfast 
with great tasting coffee, or maybe a cappuccino. They probably live 
in splendid opulence. Their mansions might be as big as the shanty 
towns where the people who make their shoes reside. But why 
shouldn’t they live in such affluence? I mean don’t they deserve it? 
In the last twenty years they have skillfully cut costs by transporting 
thousands of decent paying American factory jobs to third world 
countries where the workers are paid a tiny fraction of what their 
American equivalents made. Meanwhile thousands of Americans 
were put out of work, and when they managed to find new work 
they generally worked for less money (www.sweatshopwatch.org).  
Factory pay dropped by two percent between 12 and 17 while 
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the executives in charge received raises around 500% (Ross ).  
 
I wonder what a typical day for a teenage sweatshop worker would 
be like. From my research in No Sweat by Andrew Ross and www.
sweatshopwatch.org I can gather that it is a very unpleasant day. 
He rises early in the morning  to get his own breakfast if he has any 
at all.  His parents, if he is still with them, are probably very poor 
(Ross 103). He lives in wretched conditions with poor sanitation and 
bacteria everywhere. He is uneducated, it is too expensive, and it 
would take up working time anyways (Ross 103). He works hard for 
fourteen to fifteen hours, with a short lunch break (Ross 103). He 
must physically burn himself in order to meet high quotas. When he 
doesn’t meet his quotas he is likely beaten (Ross 8). At the end of 
the day he  stumbles home,  with enough energy to eat and sleep. In 
order to gain energy for another hard day.
 
The workers tried to  improve their conditions, by forming  unions. 
Or at least they tried to get laws passed that would give them some 
protection. Unfortunately, unionizing for these sweatshop workers 
is like Americans trying to get the minimum wage to be a hundred 
dollars an hour. It just is not practical with their current conditions. 
The first impediment for unions is the lack of government support. 
The governments themselves often brutally suppress unions (www.
sweatshopwatch.org). If the government does not directly suppress 
the unions it does so  by ignoring the sweatshop managements’ sup-
pression efforts (Ross 116). If  the unions do succeed,  the companies 
just close shop and relocate to another location without unions 
(www.sweatshopwatch.org). Management often hires assassins and 
death squads to deal brutally with the leaders of unions (Ross 116). 
The sweatshop supervisors maintain a computerized database of 
suspected union members with photographs and fake names (Ross 
87). It is impossible to get a job if you are in the computer blacklist. 
It is amazing how extensive the efforts at union suppression are in 
many of the third world countries. It is the sweatshop managements’ 
grim recognition of the fact that if their workers  are allowed to 
unionize similar to workers in America, it would mean the end of 
brutally cheap labor and skyrocketing incomes for management.
  
The L.V. Myles factory in Haiti is a subcontractor for Disney. Charles 
Kernaghan, a senior official in the National Labor Committee went 
there and recorded some impressions and testimony from sweat-
shop workers there. One laborer commented that “they [manage-
ment] treat you like garbage. They don’t look at you as a human 
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being, but as a piece of shit. The owners wont even talk to us, and 
if they don’t like your face or you’re sick, they fire you” (Ross 101).  
The laborer is required to complete 200 pieces of clothing every 
hour.  “The supervisors pace the assembly lines clapping their hands 
and shrieking at the workers to go faster” (Ross 101).  “At the end of 
the day all the workers are exhausted” (Ross 101).
I am allotted plenty of breaks. Today I am working the longest shift; 
it is scheduled for eight and a half hours , so I get two fifteen minute 
breaks and one half hour break. Sometimes I sneak in an extra break 
if I’m tired because the managers don’t really care as long as you 
don’t leave when the department is busy, or if you’re all by yourself. 
During my break I am able to do many things. I can watch TV, read 
a newspaper, or just chill in the break room. If I feel like it I can walk 
around the store and shop, or I can walk through the mall go to 
other stores. Sometimes I drive home and play video games on my 
break. My breaks are pretty relaxing; my biggest complaint is I wish 
they had couches in the break room to take a nap.
The executives of the  famous manufacturing companies have much 
to be happy about.  They live lavishly  and labor issues are not a 
source of stress for them. For most twenty-first century apparel 
executives, labor issues means  impoverished countries will work 
for the least amount of money. The bulk of their labor force is non 
union. In fact technically it’s not even their labor force. They have 
trickily worked through a system of contractors and sub contractors 
so that they can deny guilt (Ross 111). When public pressure mounts 
to improve wages and conditions, the executives can say they are 
trying hard and sending inspectors, but after all it’s not really their 
workforce so they can’t directly  resolve the issues. Yet, the sub-
contractors themselves can’t afford to change things because their 
contracts with the big designer companies are usually low priced. If 
they attempt to negotiate a fairer price, the designers simply go to 
another contractor. (www.sweatshopwatch.org).
At the N.S. Mart factory which is another Disney subcontractor, 
Kernaghan recorded some more testimony. “The workers told us 
the plant is hot, dusty, and poorly lit.  Some complained about having 
trouble with their eyesight and respiratory problems” (Ross 8).  
Sexual abuse is rampant. One worker said a manger named Hillarie 
is the worst, “you either give in to him or you are fired” (Ross 98). 
Every worker Kernaghan talked too readily testified to being short 
changed on his pay. (Ross 8). A mother who had three kids said all 
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her children were sick, and she was unable to afford the medicine 
to cure them (Ross 7). Their toilet was a hole in the ground shared 
with ten other families (Ross 7). No wonder her children were ill; 
there was bacteria and germs everywhere. Her children were weak; 
they often went days without dinner.  Instead of eating they would 
just go to sleep.
After the CEOs drastically cut production costs, they continued to 
mark up the shoes and their companies’ profits skyrocketed (Ross 
26). These CEOs have taken their increased profits and reinvested 
them into paying celebrities like Michael Jordan, millions of dollars to 
endorse their products. Celebrity investments makes their products 
even more marketable. In 12 Michael Jordan earned more than 
Nike’s entire Indonesian workforce combined (Ross ).  Maybe from 
a business perspective the CEOs deserve a five hundred percent 
pay raise, but they have ruined the lives of almost every decent hard 
working American and many foreign workers in the process. These 
executives  look at the charts, steep line graphs, and see record 
profits,but they don’t see what was lost to make them. These suc-
cessful soft lines executives (as shoes and clothes are referred to at 
Sears) have ignored all casualties to achieve their goal.
  
I continue my day at Sears. I just got off my half hour lunch break 
where I had a sandwich. It was pretty good. As I go back to the 
warehouse to retrieve some shoes, I realize that the warehouse is 
the closest I will get to a sweatshop. It is pretty dark and dusty. The 
ladders are a little rickety, and I’m always a little nervous climbing 
to the top of them. My imagination is a gigantic stretch from what a 
real sweatshop is like, something I hopefully will never experience.  I 
finish my day a little tired, but happy and confident that more money, 
and the correct amount, will be in my bank account soon.
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